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Abstract
Background: In recent years, the voluntary over-the-counter (OTC) carbon market has reached a significant market
volume. It is particularly interesting for forest mitigation projects which are either ineligible in compliance markets
or confronted with a plethora of technical and financial hurdles and lacking market demand. As the OTC market is
not regulated, voluntary standards have been created to secure the social and environmental integrity of the
traded mitigation projects and thus to ensure the quality of the resulting carbon credits. Building on a theoretical
efficiency-legitimacy framework, this study aims to identify and analyse the characteristics and indicators that
determine the efficiency and organisational legitimacy of standards for afforestation/reforestation carbon projects.
Results: All interviewed market actors consider third-party certification and standards as a crucial component of
market functionality, which provide quality assurance mechanisms that reduce information asymmetries and moral
hazard between the actors regarding the quality of carbon credits, and thus reduce transaction costs. Despite this
development, the recent evolution of many new and differing standards is seen as a major obstacle that renders it
difficult for project developers and buyers to select an appropriate standard. According to the interviewed experts
the most important legitimating factors of standards are assurance of a sufficient level of quality of carbon credits,
scientifically substantiated methodological accounting and independent third-party verification, independence of
standard bodies, transparency, wide market acceptance, back-up of the wider community including experts and
NGOs, rigorous procedures, and the resemblance to the Afforestation/Reforestation (A/R) CDM due to its
international policy endorsements. In addition, standards must provide evidence that projects contribute to a
positive social and environmental development, do no harm as a minimum requirement and build a strong track
record of successful projects. Project developers require clear, easily and practically applicable standards at lowest
possible costs with a high potential in order to achieve good carbon prices, while buyers require that standards
are legitimate, credible and that no public criticism arises when carbon credits are purchased from projects
certified by a certain standard.
Conclusions: Despite the fragmented and immature state of the OTC market, standards act as ‘market-making’
intermediaries and contribute to the quality and transparency of the OTC market. However, the variety of different
standards imposes new hurdles for their efficiency and often creates confusion instead of confidence among
potential buyers. Despite the lacking legitimacy of the standards, pressures from the institutional environment on
standards ensure a minimum quality of carbon credits (including positive social and environmental impacts of
carbon credits) that serves as an insurance mechanism for the integrity of standards. Its unregulated nature and
the pressure from an increasingly competitive environment provides innovative space to deliver efficient
certification procedures without imposing unreasonably high transaction costs on market actors. Furthermore,
voluntary standards imply a more innovative certification approach, as one legal authority could do, because
standards have to compete for adopters backed by civil society organisations. Thereby, the forest sector in OTC
voluntary market bears great opportunities to provide the forest sector with crucial lessons for international climate
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reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.policy and governmental institutions when designing regulation for forest regulation such as international and
national REDDplus schemes.
Background
Increasing evidence of rapid climate change has further
fuelled the search for options to mitigate emissions and
stresses the need to make use of the potential forests
provide in this context [1]. Although the options have
been discussed for years, the considerable potential pre-
dicted by the IPCC to reduce emissions from deforesta-
tion and degradation in developing countries
(REDDplus) as well as to enhance carbon sequestration
through afforestation/reforestation (A/R) activities or
sustainable forest management (SFM) is still far from
being realized [2]. While REDDplus still depends on
resolving many open questions, the project-based A/R
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto
Protocol has so far only yielded a few projects. Reasons
are the scientific complexity associated to quantifying
and accounting for the carbon fluxes, the risks asso-
ciated with non-permanence, costly and lengthy bureau-
cratic rules and modalities, and most importantly the
temporary accounting of Certified Emission Reductions
(CERs) and the higher transaction costs compared to
other CDM project types. Particularly the latter con-
straints make such credits unattractive to buyers and
CDM investors [2].
Parallel to the launch of several compliance carbon
markets, an over-the-counter (OTC) voluntary carbon
market has evolved that until today constitutes the lar-
gest market for forestry-based carbon credit transactions
[3] - one of the reasons being that the largest allow-
ance-based Kyoto cap-and-trade carbon market, the
Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) of the European
Union, has deferred to include forestry under its frame-
work. Since 2005, Voluntary/Verified Emission Reduc-
tions (VER) transactions within the forest and land use
sector rose from 3.5 MtCO2-eq in 2006 (36% market
share) to about 28.4 MtCO2-eq in 2010 (46% market
share), while the REDD and A/R sectors have been the
major sources of VERs with 17.8 and 6.8 MtCO2-eq
respectively in 2010 [4,5]. The remaining forestry-based
transactions resulted from projects aiming at reducing
emissions from deforestation or enhancing forest carbon
stocks through improved forest management (IFM).
The OTC voluntary carbon market is characterised by
fragmentation and diversity of actors with different
organisational contexts and is subject to dynamic devel-
opment. VERs are created on a project basis and carbon
credit exchanges occur voluntarily and individually.
There is neither a body in charge of regulating carbon
credit generation and exchanges, nor do commonly
accepted formal rules on the quality and trade of carbon
credits exist. In light of its unregulated nature and the
growing amount of transactions, public scrutiny and
media attention have been increasingly questioning the
quality of forest carbon offsets, doubting whether these
are real, additional and harmless to people and the
environment. Further criticism concerns the complexity
of measuring, monitoring and verifying forest carbon
stock changes as well as adequately coping with the for-
estry-specific uncertainties of permanence, leakage and
social and environmental integrity of forest carbon
projects.
In order to address these issues, different non-govern-
mental organizations have developed certification
schemes during the last few years. They aim to set stan-
dards for different aspects, such as greenhouse gas
(GHG) quantification, for social and environmental
aspects, for monitoring, reporting and verification, as
well as for registration of VERs. Although these stan-
dards today constitute a crucial component of the mar-
ket’s functionality and legitimacy, the variety and
diversity of standards with various scopes and
approaches has failed to generate transparency and has
led to confusion among market participants regarding
the assessment of the quality and integrity of the traded
credits [6-9].
The paper at hand presents the results of a recent
study carried out at the University of Freiburg. Its objec-
tive was to identify and analyse the characteristics and
indicators determining the efficiency and organisational
legitimacy of standards for A/R carbon projects on the
basis of a theoretical efficiency-legitimacy framework.
The main underlying assumptions were that single or
combined application of different forest carbon stan-
dards in the voluntary carbon market can only succeed
if they
￿ allow for the generation of carbon credits at low
transaction costs and thus facilitate efficient transac-
tions between project developers and buyers,
￿ ensure the quality of carbon credits (VERs) as well
as social and environmental benefits, and
￿ if they succeed in building a significant level of
credibility and market acceptance.
In the following we present the scope of forest carbon
standards in the OTC market and elaborate on the the-
oretical efficiency-legitimacy framework, the methodolo-
gical approach and the results. Finally, we discuss
Merger and Pistorius Carbon Balance and Management 2011, 6:4
http://www.cbmjournal.com/content/6/1/4
Page 2 of 12whether and how forest carbon standards in the volun-
tary carbon market operate as innovative market makers
with regards to their efficiency and organisational legiti-
macy, followed by conclusions on the role of forest car-
bon standards in the OTC market.
Scope of Forest Carbon Standards in the OTC Market
Carbon dioxide is an intangible and invisible commod-
ity. Therefore it is a challenge to determine the quality
of carbon credits; both, value and integrity are deter-
mined by the elements of how they are “defined, repre-
sented and guaranteed” [10]. According to WWF, the
quality of a forest carbon offset depends on whether it
is “real, additional, measurable, independently verifiable,
permanent, unique and [whether it] has sustainable
development benefits” [11]. Considering these attributes,
there is always the problem that the information regard-
ing the quality of a carbon credit is asymmetrically dis-
tributed between the project developers and the buyers.
The production of low quality credits normally costs
less than that of high quality credits. If quality does not
matter, there is a considerable risk of opportunistic
behaviour of carbon credit suppliers as they have a
rational interest to achieve high revenues and at the
same time to minimize costs. As a result, high quality
projects become less competitive in comparison to low
quality projects [12]. At the same time, the buyer - also
acting rational - will choose the cheapest credits, even-
tually leading to a “race-to-the-bottom” because he is
not aware of the actual quality of a carbon offset. Since
the purchase of carbon credits in the OTC market is
voluntary, another option for the buyer would be not to
purchase any carbon credits at all. In order to fill this
quality assurance gap, recently evolving third-party stan-
dards with different foci act as regulative market institu-
tions: they aim at ensuring a minimum quality of
carbon offsets, seek to provide more transparency and
functionality, and try to build confidence among market
actors [7,9,13].
Fundaments of Forest Carbon Standards
Since there is no institutionalized framework for stan-
dards in the voluntary market, the development of stan-
dards is not subject to any formal regulation.
Nonetheless, in order to guarantee harmonised, compar-
able and high quality carbon credits, certification must
ensure that carbon credits meet the above mentioned
characteristics in order to legitimise forest carbon offset-
ting activities. With respect to these quality attributes,
Broekhoff distinguishes between three fundamental
components of standards that comply with WWF’s
meta-standard framework and the WWF forest carbon
standards assessment guide [10,11,14]; these compo-
nents are comprised of
(1) carbon accounting (additionality, baseline, leakage,
quantification and accounting of GHG benefits, perma-
nence, social and environmental performance)
(2) monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV),
including guidance, third-party validation and verifica-
tions, and accreditation of validating/verifying
institutions
and (3) registration and enforcement (preventing dou-
ble counting, utilisation of independent registries, gui-
dance on ownership and liabilities of reversal of GHG
benefits).
Carbon accounting standards must provide consistent
guidance for the monitoring, reporting and verification
(MRV) of the actual carbon sequestration or emission
reductions in all relevant carbon pools, aiming to ensure
that the effects are real, additional, permanent, and mea-
surable. This includes the identification of geographical
project boundaries, baseline scenarios, additionality,
leakage, and permanence [11]. Standards must further
define rules that enable independent third-party auditors
to verify the actual emission reductions and carbon
removals as outlined in the project design documenta-
tion [10]. Finally, as these third-parties should facilitate
objective project audit, they must be accredited and pro-
vide evidence of sufficient expertise to conduct certifica-
tions in accordance with a specific accounting standard.
In addition to these accounting issues, the WWF meta-
standard framework (MSF) requires “credible and com-
prehensive standards” to also include criteria, tools and
features that guarantee and assess the project’se n v i r o n -
mental and social integrity, taking into account that for-
est carbon projects are embedded in large spatial and
socio-economic environments.
Although there is no regulatory authority in the OTC
market, registration and enforcement is another crucial
element in order to cope with the risk that carbon cred-
its are sold or counted more than once. Such “double
counting” may also occur if projects are implemented in
annex I countries that are subject to Articles 3.3 and 3.4
of the Kyoto Protocol [15], e.g. when carbon credits are
registered in both the respective national carbon registry
a n di na d d i t i o ni nav o l u n t a r y carbon market registry.
The same risk occurs if projects are registered in two
different voluntary registries. Moreover, unclear owner-
ship of carbon credits may result in conflicts over the
right to sell these.
In practice, the standards presently active in the
voluntary market provide different guidance and
approaches for dealing with these fundamental issues.
Currently, three types of standards integrate the
described pivotal components to different degrees.
Thereby the differentiation is made between modular
pure greenhouse gas (GHG) accounting standards that
issue certified VERs, pure social and environmental
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that issue VERs and require that projects generate posi-
tive social and environmental impacts (table 1). In order
to meet all the requirements for high quality carbon
credits, such standards should be comprehensive or can
be combined through double certification - as it often
occurs in practice, because out of nine forest carbon
standards that are currently applicable, there is currently
no standard that entails all essential components.
Theoretical Background: An Efficiency-Legitimacy
Framework
The “efficiency-legitimacy framework” is based on the
New Institutionalism in organisational analysis and the
concept of “societal sectors” or “organizational fields”
[29,30]. A societal sector is defined by “(1) a collection
of organizations operating in the same domain, as iden-
tified by the similarity of their services, products or
functions, (2) together with those organizations that cri-
tically influence the performance of the focal
organizations: for example, major suppliers and custo-
mers, owners and regulators, funding sources and com-
petitors.” Scott and Meyer distinguish between two
coexisting societal sectors in which organisations’ activ-
ities take place, such as a competitive, efficiency-driven
and an institutional sector [30]. The competitive effi-
ciency-driven sector is a sphere where a “product or a
service is produced and exchanged in a market such
that organizations are rewarded for effective and effi-
cient control of their production systems,” seeking to
produce in a more competitive way than their competi-
tors with the objective to maximise their returns on
investment.
In contrast, the institutional environment is “charac-
terised by the elaboration of rules and requirements to
which individual organisations must conform if they are
to receive support and legitimacy” [30]. Generally, those
organisations that adopt processes and structures com-
plying with the rules and requirements of the institu-
tional environment tend to be more successful. The
Table 1 Overview fundamental components of forest carbon standards
Standard A/R
CDM
American
Carbon
Registry
(ACR)
CarbonFix
Standard
(CFS)
Climate
Action
Reserve
(CAR)
Climate,
Community &
Biodiversity
Standards (CCBS)
ISO
14064-2/
3:2006
Plan Vivo
Standards
Social
Carbon
Standard
Verified
Carbon
Standard
(VCS)
Eligible project
location
Non-
Annex I
countries
Globally Globally United
States of
America
Globally Globally Developing
countries
Globally Globally
Baseline/
Additionality
✔✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ o ✔ o ✔
Leakage ✔✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ o ✔ o ✔
Quantification and
accounting of GHGs
✔✔ ✔ ✔ ✓ ✔✔o ✔
Permanence ✔✔ ✔ ✔ Not applicable o ✔ Not
applicable
✔
Environmental and
social performance
✓✓ ✔ ✓ ✔ o ✔✔✓
Monitoring
guidance
✔✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔✔✔✔
3
rd-party
validation/
verification
✔✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔✓✔✔
Accreditation of
validators/verifiers
✔✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✔✓✓✔
Prevention of
double counting
w ✔✔ Not
applicable
Not applicable Not
applicable
✔ Not
applicable
✔
Independent
registry
✔✓ ✔ ✓ Not applicable Not
applicable
✔✔✔
Guidance on
ownership &
liabilities for GHG
reversals
✔✔ ✔ ✔ ✓ Not
applicable
✔ Not
applicable
✔
✔ = The standard sets regulation on the fundamental component
✓ = The standard partially sets regulation on the fundamental component
○ = The standards does set regulation on the fundamental component
Not applicable = Due to the scope of the standard, this criteria does require regulation
The table is based on the review of the respective standards documents and the respective websites of each standard [16-28]
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may originate from different authorities such as the
state, trade associations, or generalised belief systems
that determine a legitimate organisational structure,
activities, and other sources.
In a competitive efficiency-driven and an institutional
environment of organisations, the pressure to conform
to institutional rules often prohibits efficiency because
actors and organisations are subject to a continuously
changing institutional environment and have to simulta-
neously withstand competition from other organisations
[31]. They “compete not just for resources and custo-
mers, but for political power, and institutional legiti-
macy, for social as well as economic fitness” [29]. In this
light, the underlying rational choice paradigm of
bounded rationally builds a further corner stone of the
theoretical framework - actors do not have perfect infor-
mation; they behave “intentionally rational, but only lim-
itedly so” [32]. This implies that even though they seek
to make rational decisions, the lack of time to gather
and process information as well as to sufficiently evalu-
ate all possible alternatives, constrains actors to behave
entirely rational [33]. Accordingly, the actors are forced
to consider market transaction costs in their decision
processes, arising from [34]:
￿ search and information costs for potential trade
partners and initiation of contracts,
￿ costs from closing contracts including negotiations
and decision-making,
￿ costs that appear from monitoring and enforcing
contracts, and
￿ costs of making and sustaining social relationships.
The organisational set-up and governance structures
determine the efficiency of transactions and it is
assumed that costs associated with opportunism ("self-
interest seeking with guile” that may arise from lying,
stealing, cheating or distorted disclosure of information)
and bounded rationality are the reasons why organisa-
tions can economise on transactions [31,35]: organisa-
tions “arise and persist when they confer benefits
greater than the transaction costs incurred in creating
and sustaining them” [36]. According to Richter and
Furubotn, in a setting with positive transactions costs
and bounded rationality of market actors, a market can
be regarded as an organisation per se or as a social net-
work of actors who conduct repetitive exchanges [34].
In order to function, there has to be an institutional fra-
mework which consists of a comprehensive system of
conventions, norms and regulations. Such an institu-
tional framework of a market is developed and estab-
lished by so-called “market makers": governments, trade
associations, producers, brokers, and intermediaries.
Therefore, markets are characterised by a coexistence of
competition and cooperation which is based on a com-
mon and accepted set of market arrangements. Within
this institutional framework, the rationally behaving
market actors seek to conduct market transactions at
the lowest possible transaction costs to maximise their
returns on investment [34].
According to Leland, unregulated markets become
inefficient when sellers and buyers are asymmetrically
informed about the quality of products [37]. Such lack
of information and transparency complicates potential
market transactions and results in higher costs and also
in adverse selection. Suppliers have an incentive to deli-
ver low quality products while buyers, who are incapable
of determining the quality of a product, seek to pay as
little as possible. Biglaiser attributes the task of ensuring
quality to the intermediaries through experts which
assess and certify the quality, and thus help reducing
the mentioned informational asymmetries [38]. The
intermediary has an incentive to deliver high quality as
“the intermediary who sells a low-quality product suffers
a loss of reputation, thus loses customers for all other
products” [38].
This theoretic approach does not yet consider “moral
hazard” - a concept originating from contract theory,
which refers to the problem that after the finalisation of
a contract between an agent (supplier) and a principal
(buyer), the agent has more information and therefore
the possibility to act opportunistically, e.g., by cheating
or disclosing false information [34]. It may require sig-
nificant and costly efforts to observe and monitor the
characteristics of trading partners and to monitor the
enforcement of contracts. Addressing moral hazard and
opportunism, Spulber characterises intermediary firms
as “market-commitment devices” that reduce transaction
costs and contractual opportunism [38]. The obviation
of moral hazard and opportunistic behaviour by inter-
mediaries is assured through the design, control and
monitoring of appropriate contracts that comprise bind-
ing contractual commitments between buyers and sell-
ers. Thereby, intermediaries seek to build a good
reputation and credibility as they conduct larger
volumes of transactions on which they economise.
Since organisations are embedded into institutional
environments, they must not only adapt on the existent
institutional environment, but also should “modify their
environment in order to maintain competitive advan-
tages” [39]. To persist in the market, organisations seek
legitimacy to avoid sanctions from the legal, social and
economic actors [40]. Suchman defines organisational
legitimacy as “a generalized perception or assumption
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or
a p p r o p r i a t ew i t h i ns o m es o c i a l l yc o n s t r u c t e ds y s t e mo f
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” [41]. Three
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macy: “the characteristics of the institutional environ-
ment, the organization’s characteristics and actions, and
the legitimating process by which the environment
builds its perceptions of the organization” [42]. With
respect to the characteristics of the institutional envir-
onment, organisations are influenced by various actors
and are backed by various resource providers. In order
to receive legitimacy and support by the immediate
audience and the wider political, economic and social
community of the organisation, they must
￿ incorporate legitimizing elements complying with
formal and collectively accepted structures of the
institutional environment,
￿ adopt external assessment criteria that define the
value of structural elements or external constituents
of the organisations policy-making structures,
￿ engage with other institutions, e.g. centralised
states, trade unions or associations [41].
In a nutshell, to establish a moral legitimacy organisa-
tions must prove the usefulness of their operations, out-
puts and goals though a positive normative third party
evaluation. Moral legitimacy can be considered as
“sociotropic": internal participants and external constitu-
ents make judgements in accordance with their socially
constructed value systems assessing organisations’ socie-
tal benefits [41].
Methods
The outcomes of this explorative study result from a quali-
tative research design based on various sources [43-45].
After a thorough literature review, 13 structured expert
interviews were carried out in 2010 via telephone with
actors actively engaged in the forest sector of the OTC
market. In the selection process, market actors were
approached with a proven personal track record in the for-
est carbon market sector, e.g. by developing or purchasing
forest carbon credits, applying the standards or by publish-
ing research on this topic. After that, three major groups
were selected that represent the competitive and institu-
tional environment of the voluntary carbon market.
Among these three groups four project developers of A/R
carbon projects, four buyers of forest carbon credits and
five other market stakeholders were interviewed. Although
the latter group, labelled “quality guarantors for civil
society”, is not directly involved in the production and
purchase of forest carbon credits, it is crucial in the con-
text of the topic because it scrutinises, evaluates, and com-
municates the quality and robustness of forest carbon
credits, projects and standards. This group of interviewees
consists of an environmental NGO, a scientist, a media
representative, an independent third-party auditor and a
standard setter.
The questions followed a structured interview guide
and encouraged the interviewees to elaborate in detail
on their personal perceptions and experiences. Subse-
quently, the transcribed and paraphrased interviews
were analysed by conducting a qualitative content analy-
sis which was guided by the aim to embed the results
into the developed theoretical efficiency-legitimacy fra-
mework and explain the role of forest carbon standards
with regard to the research objectives. The main objec-
tive was the identification of representative and common
perceptions in order to identify and develop interpreta-
tive patterns [46]. Thus, the thematic comparison was
conducted through the compaction and structuring of
the interviews into thematic categories, using
MAXQDA, a qualitative data analysis software package
for structuring, extracting and analysing information
[47].
Results
This chapter presents the keyr e s u l t so ft h ec o n d u c t e d
interviews. Initially, the perceptions of the experts on
the A/R sector in the OTC market are presented. Subse-
quently, the role of forest carbon standards as market
regulators is assessed, followed by aspects related to
their efficiency and organisational legitimacy.
A/R carbon sector in the OTC voluntary carbon market
All interviewed actor groups consistently regard A/R
and the entire forest sector in the OTC voluntary car-
bon market as immature, but differentiated between the
pre-compliance market in the US and the pure volun-
tary market: Most research participants consider the US
pre-compliance demand as a significant driver of supply
in the OTC market. With the expectation of a future
compliance regime, it is believed that the forestry sector
will play an important role due to its potential to deliver
quick and low-cost carbon credits, as well as the gener-
ally positive attitude of US buyers towards forestry.
However, in 2010 the pre-compliance demand from the
US plummeted because the prospects for US federal cli-
mate change legislation worsened while simultaneously
uncertainties regarding a future US carbon market
increased [48]. Concerning the voluntary market, the
interviewees indicated that in recent years there has
been a lacking supply of high quality third-party certi-
fied forest-based credits. They pointed out that during
the last three years third-party certification in the OTC
market has become a prerequisite to enter the market.
They also stressed the lengthy and difficult process from
the project concept up to its implementation and that
third-party certification can take up to several years.
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immature A/R forest carbon sector: political constraints,
technical complexity, high development and implemen-
tation costs, and lacking transparency on quality assur-
ance in the OTC market.
An often mentioned political constraint is the inelig-
ibility of forest carbon credits in the EU ETS compliance
market despite a perceived increasing recognition that
forestry needs to play a key role in climate change miti-
gation - particularly among European VER-buyers, who
historically had a rather negative perception towards
forestry for carbon sequestration. The major technical
constraints result from the MRV of climate benefits, the
unique socio-economic and environmental conditions of
A/R projects, the required level of expertise, and the
high costs of developing, certifying and implementing
projects. The project-specific socio-economic and envir-
onmental conditions require individual, long-term
designs, considering the long lifetimes of forest projects,
as explained by project developers and quality guaran-
tors. Furthermore, in most cases only large-scale pro-
jects tend to be financially attractive, thus a certain size
of projects needs to be achieved in order to make these
feasible. Lastly, the experts from the quality guarantor
group and the buyers’ group mentioned the lack of
robust quality assurance mechanisms and a supply of
certified high-quality credits that was not able to meet
the demand.
Since all these aspects have to be dealt with, it is a
l e n g t h yp r o c e d u r et op r e p a r eappropriate project docu-
mentation and to certify A/R projects, impairing their
competitiveness compared to other non-forest project
types. Consequently, only large-scale A/R projects tend
to be attractive for investors, as these are capable of
creating the significant upfront finance for covering the
arising costs for project certification and the subsequent
MRV. In addition, the long duration of forest projects
delay the revenues from such projects, remarkably con-
straining investments in such projects.
Forest Carbon Standards in the OTC Market
After identifying the constraining aspects of the A/R
sector, the focus was to investigate actors’ perceptions
towards existing forest carbon standards with respect to
their role as market regulating entities and their compe-
titive forces. In addition, the views on organisational
legitimacy were assessed.
All interviewed market actors regard certification and
standards as a crucial component of market functional-
i t y ,w h i c hp r o v i d eaq u a l i t ya s s u r a n c em e c h a n i s mt h a t
reduces information asymmetries between the actors
regarding the quality of carbon credits. Particularly for
brokers, retailers and wholesalers, standards were
regarded as a fundamental underpinning to purchase
and subsequently sell the credits. For project developers,
standards provide a guiding framework for the mini-
mum quality of projects that ought to be met in order
to successfully enter the market and to sell the credits.
The standards also provide guidance for principles and
procedures that legitimise the project activities to other
stakeholders of the projects. According to the intervie-
wees, the recent development of different standards in
the OTC market has been crucial: credible and widely
accepted certification has become a key prerequisite for
selling forest carbon credits.
Despite this, the recent evolution of many new and
differing standard schemes is considered a major obsta-
cle, creating difficulties for project developers and
buyers to select appropriate standards. The availability
of the various options comprises uncertainties about the
efficacy and credibility of the standard schemes to the
market participants. As only few A/R projects have gone
through the entire certification and verification proce-
dures yet, only few credits were delivered to the market
and accordingly the amount of experiences is rather
small. This dynamic market development is regarded by
the interviewees as an indicator that market actors have
not yet identified a standardised solution; due to this
shortcoming, most standards are used and accepted by
the majority of the market actors, leading to competi-
tion between the standard schemes.
It appears that despite the different standards, there is
little confidence that their application provides an effec-
tive mechanism for market actors to ensure the quality
of projects and forest offsets to the extent that buyers
can solely rely on them as quality assurance mechan-
isms. Project developers and other interviewees indi-
cated that this may be related to the fact that buyers
often are not familiar enough with the standards. As a
consequence, many buyers undertake additional project
analysis and due diligences that increase transaction
costs significantly.
Efficiency of Forest Carbon Standards
Project developers and the quality assurance actors
regarded the high quality benchmark set by the A/R
CDM for voluntary markets as a major constraint, as it
is considered a complex, costly and overly bureaucratic
mechanism. The interviewees pointed out that this
neither effective nor efficient benchmark unnecessarily
complicates the design of voluntary forest standards.
As all land-based projects are embedded in complex
socio-economic and large spatial dimensions, such pro-
jects must address social and environmental issues in
order to reduce the risk associated with the acceptance
and involvement of local stakeholders, permanence and
leakage. As there exists no accepted “one-size-fits-all"-
standard, it is regarded as a further significant and costly
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least two forest carbon standards in order to separately
account for carbon benefits and the crucial socio-eco-
nomic and environmental benefits (table 1). Moreover,
the project developers emphasised that the data collec-
tion, compilation and analysis require significant labour
and time resources, which are the main drivers for the
high transaction costs in forestry projects. Consequently,
they seek for standards following a comprehensive
approach, i.e. a consideration of carbon benefits as well
as the social and environmental impacts. To them the
application of two different sta n d a r d sr e q u i r e ss i g n i f i -
cant additional work for project documentation and cer-
tification that increases transaction costs. However, they
also pointed out that these costs also depend on the
expertise of the project developers, because low quality
project design documents significantly increase the costs
of third-party validation and verification.
Since most forest carbon projects and certification
activities have begun in the last few years, many project
developers are still at the beginning of the learning
curve; with increasing experience in the application of
standards, they will be able to streamline and optimise
methodological and procedural issues and conduct pro-
ject documentation and certification in a more cost-
effective and efficient manner. Regarding the technical
constraints of A/R project certification, well experienced
actors emphasised the lack of widely applicable and
easily available technical and scientific data that are
required to make project documentation more complete.
Organisational Legitimacy of Forest Carbon Standards
Since standards act as quality assurance mechanisms in
the OTC market and the buyers so far undertake cli-
mate change mitigating activities on a voluntary basis,
they must define effective safeguards for the quality of
VERs in order to build confidence between buyers and
project developers, and also to facilitate market transac-
tions. In this context, the interviewees regarded a certain
level of credibility and market acceptance as crucial.
However, the perceptions differed on how the standards
can achieve an overall credibility and market acceptance.
According to the interviewees, the most important
legitimating factors of standards are assurance of a suffi-
cient level of quality of carbon credits, scientifically sub-
stantiated methodological accounting and independent
third-party verification. In addition, standards must pro-
vide evidence that projects contribute to a positive social
and environmental development, and do no harm as a
minimum requirement. A further legitimating aspect is
the organisational background of a standard, in particu-
lar the expertise and the backing of reputable entities
incorporated in the standard. To meet these criteria
standards have to be independent, free of conflict of
interests and underpinned by scientific expertise;
furthermore they need the recognition of reputable
environmental and social NGOs, conveying legitimacy
to the standards according to the buyers and quality
guarantors. Thus, it can be ensured that interests of the
civil society are sufficiently represented and that trans-
parent and rigorous procedures and principles of stan-
dard schemes are implemented.
Moreover, buyers demanded that standards need to
transparently demonstrate their long-term success and
applicability by building a track record of successful pro-
jects and carbon transactions that deliver permanent cli-
mate, social and environmental benefits. This long-term
viability of projects under a certain forest carbon standard
is regarded as a decisive factor and plays an important role
in the decision-making to select standards for the certifica-
tion of A/R projects in the OTC market. Additional signif-
icant legitimating power originates from the actual
consumers who decide on standards’ integrity by purchas-
ing credits from projects that are certified by specific stan-
dards. Last but not least, a critical aspect of legitimacy is
the governmental endorsement of standards mentioned by
buyers and quality guarantors. The governmental support
or acceptance could considerably increase the integrity of
standards, their market acceptance and confidence. This is
particularly crucial to actors with pre-compliance pursuits.
Therefore, standard developers should also undertake
efforts to become acceptable and suitable for public activ-
ities and governmental authorities.
Discussion
The results show that the OTC market is still in an
immature state, despite the development of standards
and registries that have been an essential advancement
of the market’s integrity. The variety of standards under-
mines the credibility of the entire forest carbon sector
and poses barriers to market actors to enter the market
and to operate efficiently. In the future, having the
choice to use different but complementary standards
may yield potential advantages, but currently their mul-
titude is perceived as a constraint. Another impediment
is the fragmentation of the market, as there are no
powerful entities that influence and drive the develop-
ment of widely accepted standards that lead the market’s
development and engage in the legitimating process of
standards by developing and promoting these. In the fol-
lowing, we discuss forest carbon standards’ role as mar-
ket makers, their efficiency and their organisational
legitimacy based on the theoretical efficiency-legitimacy
framework and the results from the interviews.
Standards as market makers
In view of the presented theoretical efficiency-legitimacy
framework, standard schemes act as market making
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genous and transparent quality of forest carbon credits
by facilitating “coordination and cooperation on a global
scale” [49]. In practice, standards seek to regulate the
functionality of the market by facilitating transactions of
carbon credits and reducing the required efforts in
order to obtain information on the potential trading
partners and the quality of carbon credits. This includes
less asymmetric information and reduced moral hazard
between buyers and project developers of forest carbon
offsets which reduces transaction costs. The voluntary
nature of standards implies that they are not enforced
by any legitimate authorities, but actively demanded by
private profit and non-profit organisations alike. Gener-
ally, standardisation is a mean of facilitating market
exchanges if there is no “legal centre of authority” and
“provides coordination and control on the basis of
agreed procedures,” quality and definitions [50,51]. The
impetus to create standards is normally higher if the
market is fragmented, not transparent and comprised of
various actors or organisations that do not have the
power to drive and shape the market. Standardisation
can lead to more uniform quality of products and rules,
and eases the confidence of buyers and project develo-
pers on the integrity of the market [52].
In general, the better a standard is known, the larger
the amount of adopters will be if it produces similarities
among them [52]. In contrast, if there are many compet-
ing standards, there is the likelihood of diverse quality
and a varying degree of uniformity. Uniformity will
increase if certain standards gain more adopters and if
standards have more followers. Thus, it is likely that
new market actors will also adopt these standards that
give way to monopoly of them, reducing the pressure to
be innovative and to be efficient [52]. This implies
trade-offs between competition and innovation of stan-
dards. On the one hand, strong competition leads to
diverse quality of forest carbon credits that results in a
non-standardised product imposing high transaction
costs on market actors to evaluate the quality and navi-
gate among the standards. On the other hand, competi-
tion is a pivotal driver of innovation as standards in the
OTC market compete for potential adopters seeking to
develop the most attractive solutions to make carbon
credits fungible in the market.
Efficiency
According to the theory of New Institutional Economics,
efficient standardisation relates to the ability of stan-
dards to facilitate exchanges between buyers and project
developers without imposing too high transaction costs
[33]. This corresponds to low costs for standards’ appli-
cation, avoidance of moral hazard and removal of infor-
mational asymmetries. Therefore, one major aspect of
efficiency seeking forest carbon standards is the reduc-
tion of costs for project certification and the reduction
of information asymmetries on the quality of a carbon
credits between the project developers and the buyers.
Efficient standards create confidence among the actors,
help to attract buyers, and ensure quality. The results of
this study show that the current forest carbon standards
are not yet able to build sufficient confidence among
potential buyers as they do not solely trust certification
to the standard schemes and undertake own additional
efforts to assess the quality of projects. Reasons are the
variety, low transparency and the incomplete nature of
the many standards (table 1). Often this leads to the uti-
lisation of at least two standards schemes for A/R pro-
jects to ensure carbon accounting on the one hand, and
social and environmental integrity on the other. This
leads to higher transaction costs through the duplication
of work associated with preparing project documenta-
tion and certification procedures. The additional trans-
action costs are passed on to buyers, which further
contributes to the inefficiency of the A/R sector.
The results of this study also indicate a prevailing lack
of confidence of market actors regarding the integrity
and efficacy of the current active standards due to their
relatively recent establishment and few experiences with
forest projects that have lifetimes and crediting periods
of several decades. The standards have not had the
chance yet to prove their ability to guarantee and
enforce that A/R projects are maintained in the long-
t e r ma n dt h a tt h es e q u e s t e r e dc a r b o ni ss t o r e dp e r m a -
nently. There appears to be the need to integrate the
pivotal components of standards such as efficient and
effective guidance and procedures on carbon accounting
(MRV), social and environmental aspects, as well as
registration and enforcement in order to provide market
actors comprehensive and efficient standards. Consider-
ing the existing market infrastructure, this could be
achieved through consolidation and reconciliation of
standards’ requirements and procedures, eventually lead-
ing towards quality harmonisation of the supplied A/R
credits to the market. Further, standards need to be
linked to independent registries that help to coordinate
the supply and demand; this would help to reduce the
current market transaction costs and increase market
transparency.
Despite the importance of more harmonised stan-
dards, competition between standards must be regarded
as a crucial component of innovation that drives effi-
cient market development and functionality through the
requirement of standards to compete for adopters in a
constrained rationally behaving environment seeking for
the highest possible gains by applying the standards.
Otherwise, there is the risk that “once a standard has
become established and accepted, it is very difficult for
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standardisation may not only promote but also inhibit
competition and innovation” and trade-offs between
competition and innovation appear in the OTC market
[52].
Organisational Legitimacy
Approaching the non-competitive institutional environ-
ment, standards have to prove that they are “desirable,
proper, or appropriate” within the socially constructed
“norms, values, beliefs and definitions” [41]. As the
application of forest carbon standards is neither induced
nor accompanied by any mandatory requirement, legiti-
macy may be claimed by developing organisations for
their standard by seeking to “reflect what is best or at
least desirable, or that they are objectively appropriate”
[50]. The voluntary character implies an apparently less
complicated way to establish a certain degree of organi-
sational legitimacy (compared to the complex and
lengthy processes of political or mandatory authorities,
as there is no sanction for non-compliance with the
standards or not applying these. Therefore, actors will
disclaim using standards, if these are not beneficial to
them [53]. If standards are not useful or accepted, the
organisations are less legitimate, and if standards seek to
receive acceptance, these must prove that they are
“morally right, beneficial for the users, and the like”
[50]. In addition, legitimacy originates from the endorse-
ment of forest owners, their strength and costs of a
standard [53].
In practice, forest carbon standards are most likely to
achieve legitimacy if they are able to guarantee the gen-
eral quality indicators of a forest carbon offset and
through the integration of the described pivotal stan-
dards’ components. However, in practice the quality of
carbon credits is difficult to assess due to the invisible
and intangible character of carbon credits, even though
A/R projects are certified to a certain standard. There-
fore, actors active in the OTC market tend to have eva-
luation criteria of legitimate standards such as
“independence of standard bodies, transparency, wide
market acceptance, being understandable, back-up of
the wider community including experts and NGOs, rig-
orous procedures, or the resemblance to the A/R CDM”
due to its international policy endorsements.
The usefulness of standards’ activities is determined by
a range of actors and has differing influence on the
legitimacy of standards schemes. Firstly, a great level of
legitimating power is given to standards if they incorpo-
rate reputable leaders in the management and design of
standards, as Brunsson states: “Leaders of standards
must enjoy a high degree of legitimacy”,b e c a u s et h e y
have the rights to give orders and directives [50].
Another crucial aspect of legitimacy is the involvement
of experts and scientific representatives in the standard
setting process and their involvement in the manage-
ment of standards [51]. In addition, Meyer points out
the importance of academic knowledge and the develop-
ment industry that follow the wake of academic science
[51].
On the one hand, different actors have different
demands on standards with different degrees of legiti-
mating power. Therefore, interactive social and eco-
nomic processes between the various actors such as
experts, academics, project developers, buyers, NGOs,
and media determine the organisational legitimacy of
forest carbon standards. Project developers require clear,
easily and practically applicable standards at lowest pos-
sible costs with a high potential in order to achieve
good carbon prices, while buyers require that standards
are legitimate, credible and that no public criticism is
likely to occur from purchasing carbon credits from
projects certified by a certain standard. The civil society
actors act as quality guarantors and communication
tools determining standards’ integrity and the usefulness
of their activities. Therefore, legitimacy can be increased
by the support and involvement of a variety of actors
and requires support and endorsement from large cor-
porate groups (powerful agents such as reputable NGOs
or governments), as most standards do not have the
resources, the authority and power to change others’
activities [49]. Particularly governments have important
power in signalling that standards are “legitimate and
credible governance systems on which private procurers
and other buyers can also rely” [53,54].
The involvement of all the different actors in the stan-
dard setting processes and their support and moral
approval comes at a cost due to the coordinating efforts
of different interest groups, the requirement to incorpo-
rate these, and the need to communicate and promote
standards’ usefulness. Thus, legitimacy can be regarded
as a significant economic constraint in a competitive
environment that requires standards to invest: not for
the sake of efficient procedures, but to motivate and
attract potential users to apply the standards and receive
endorsement by powerful organisations through the
incorporation of elements that comply with norms,
values and definitions of a widely accepted social system.
Particularly in the weak institutional set-up of the
voluntary market and the very dynamic nature of the
forest carbon sector, the pursuit for legitimacy is a
remarkable component of standards’ activities. Consider-
ing that most forest carbon standards are younger than
five years, those that define standards must convince
actors to apply them by showing and communicating
their effectiveness and their legitimacy. Otherwise, they
will not sustain themselves in the market, as they will be
regarded as useless.
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require much more time to achieve an adequate level of
legitimacy and demonstrate their usefulness due to the
long-term horizons of forestry projects. The standards
will have to prove that they are able to ensure the long-
term sustainability of projects that generate climate ben-
efits as well as social and environmental benefits over
decades. This will only be achieved if projects have
undertaken more than one third-party verification prov-
ing the long-term compliance to the standards and
enforcement of the expected climate, social and environ-
mental benefits. Thus, standards must build a track
record of projects that generate long-term benefits for
the environment and the people delivering the market
actors confidence on their legitimacy and efficacy. This
w i l lb eal o n g - t e r mi n t e r a c t i v ep r o c e s sa m o n gm a r k e t
actors, civil society organisations, standard setters, aca-
demics, and experts who will shape the overall cognitive
perceptions on the standards determining their organi-
sational legitimacy.
Conclusion
The study has shown that OTC voluntary carbon mar-
ket is still at a dynamic developing stage characterised
by the variety of standards, their lacking efficiency and
legitimacy - despite the development of certification
schemes in recent years. Its unregulated nature and the
pressure from an increasingly competitive environment
provides innovative space to deliver efficient certification
procedures without imposing unreasonably high transac-
tion costs on market actors, and to reduce informational
asymmetries and moral hazard. The pressure resulting
from the institutional environment on standards to
ensure a minimum quality of carbon credits (including
positive social and environmental impacts of carbon
credits) serves as an insurance mechanism for the integ-
rity of standards. Increased efficiency and legitimacy of
the OTC market and a more streamlined quality of A/R
carbon credits will further depend on maturation of the
forest sector. It remains also to be seen whether the
standards will be able to provide more harmonised and
reconciled guidance and procedures for A/R carbon pro-
ject certification, resulting in a more homogenous and
complete regulation that is likely to attract new market
participants. The voluntary nature implies a more inno-
vative certification approach, as one legal authority
could do, because standards have to compete for adop-
ters backed by civil society organisations. Thereby, the
forest sector in OTC market bears great opportunities
to provide the forest sector with crucial lessons for
further development. This innovative and competitive
environment of the OTC market serves as a crucial
learning ground for international climate policy and
governmental institutions when designing regulation for
forest regulation such as international and national
REDDplus schemes, e.g. through the facilitation of new
carbon accounting methodologies, the generation of the
first third-party verified REDD carbon credits, and the
ensuring social and environmental safeguards for sub-
national REDD projects.
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